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iii.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 950441-CA

vs.

Priority No. 15

STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD,
Defendants and Appellees.
-00O00-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG
Appeal from Summary Judgment entered by the Honorable
William A. Thorne, Third Judicial District Court,
on April 25, 1995

STATEMENT

OF

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4).

This case was

assigned from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals
on or about June 23, 1995 [R 179].

1

DETERMINATIVE

AUTHORITY

In addition to the relevant case law cited hereinafter, the
Appellant in the above-entitled case believes the following
authority to be determinative of this dispute on appeal:
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-29
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court
affords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court.
Walker v. Briqham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993).

Furthermore, in

making the dtermination as to whether or not the summary judgment
below was appropriate, the appellate court will review the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 254
Utah Advance Report 3 (Utah 1994).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Third Judicial District Court in and

for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William A.
2

Thorne presiding, abused its discretion in granting the
Defendants' and Appellees' Motions to Amend their Complaints, in
order to add the statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's First
Cause of Action for assault, as an affirmative defense, after the
Defendants had failed to plead this affirmative defense in their
original Answers, and after they had failed to plead this
affirmative defense for over two (2) years thereafter [R 42, R
70].

In reviewing the lower court's ruling on a motion to amend,

a primary consideration for the appellate court should include a
determination as to whether any party received an unfair advantage
or disadvantage thereby. Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc./
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990).

2.

Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law,

in granting the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, as to
both of the Plaintiff's Causes of Action of assault and negligence
against the Defendants, by applying the year (1) year statute of
limitations for assault, which was only the Plaintiff's First
Cause of Action, to the entirety of the Plaintiff's claim [R 137].
By necessity, this issue includes a determination as to whether
the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that the
Plaintiff and Appellant could not maintain an assault, or
3

intentional cause of action, contemporaneously with a negligence
cause of action, arising out of the same fact situation [R 137;
see Standard of Review, supra].

3.

Whether there are genuine issues of material fact

remaining in this case relative to the Appellant's negligence
cause of action and with respect to equitable issues pertaining to
the injury suffered by the Plaintiff and Appellant as the result
of the Defendants' and Appellees' delay and failure, for over two
(2) years, to plead the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations [R 137; see Standard of Review, supra].

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered in favor of
the Defendants and Appellees Stan J. Christensen and Robert
Anthony Apgood in this personal injury case [R 172]. The case was
originally assigned to the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding [R 2], and was then reassigned
to the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley [R 21]. The case was ultimately
transferred on or about February 24, 1995, to Judge William A.
Thorne [R 158], and was heard before Judge Thorne on March 30,
1995 [R 170]. The subsequent Order granting the Defendants' and
Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment was signed and entered by
4

the Court on April 25, 1995 [R 172].

The Plaintiff and Appellant

filed his Notice of Appeal on May 3, 1995, which was received by
the Utah Supreme Court of the State of Utah on May 10, 1995 [R
174]. On or about June 23, 1995 this case was assigned by the
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals [R 179].

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about August 5, 1991, at approximately 8:00

p.m., the Plaintiff was assaulted and injured, through the
negligent and intentional actions of the Defendants, at the
Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan,
Utah [R 3 - R 7], where the Defendants made an unprovoked attack.

2.

As a result of this attack by the Defendants and

Appellees upon the Plaintiff and Appellant, the Plaintiff's and
Appellant's lips were sutured, and an x-ray taken of the Plaintiff
and Appellant indicated that there was a hairline fracture to the
Plaintiff's and Appellant's cheek bone [R 3 - R 7].

3*

The Defendants' and Appellees' attack upon the

Plaintiff and Appellant caused him to incur medical expenses, and
in addition the Plaintiff and Appellant suffered great pain and
mental anguish as the result of the Defendants' and Appellees'
5

conduct [R 3 - R 7] .

4.

On or about September 21, 1992, the Plaintiff and

Appellant filed his Verified Complaint, alleging the intentional
tort of assault, and also alleging negligence against the
Defendants and Appellees [R 2; also see copy of Verified
Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"].

The Defendants1 and

Appellees' conduct and attack upon the Plaintiff was done
knowingly and intentionally, as set forth within the First Cause
of Action of the Plaintiff's and Appellant's Verified Complaint
[see Exhibit "A"].

The Defendants' and Appellees' conduct was

also negligent, as set forth within the Second Cause of Action of
the Plaintiff's and Appellant's Verified Complaint [see Exhibit
"A"], in light of the potential for harm to the Plaintiff and
Appellant under said circumstances, and the lack of regard for the
safety of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and Appellant
made a claim against the Defendants and Appellees for punitive
damages in the amount of $50,000*00 [R 4; also see Exhibit "A"].

5.

In their respective Answers to the Plaintiff's and

Appellant's Verified Complaint, the Defendants and Appellees Stan
J. Christensen and Robert Anthony Apgood failed to assert the
^affirmative defense of statute of limitations [R 9, R 19].
6

6#

It is undisputed by the parties that for a period

of over two (2) years, from September of 1992 until December of
1994, the Defendants and Appellees Stan J. Christensen and Robert
Anthony Apgood, who both made the election to act as pro se
litigants, did not attempt to assert this affirmative defense,
either in an amended answer or otherwise [R 137].

7.

The Plaintiff and Appellant relied upon this

failure to assert the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations, and conducted discovery and otherwise directed his
legal counsel to proceed with his case, incurring thousands of
dollars of expense for costs and legal fees over the last two (2)
years [R 137].

8.

The Defendant and Appellee Stan J. Christensen

finally retained counsel to represent him, which counsel filed a
Notice of Appearance on or about November 1, 1994 [R 29], and the
Defendant Robert Anthony Apgood finally retained counsel to
represent him, which counsel filed a Notice of Appearance on or
about December 5, 1994 [R 55, R 67].

9.

Counsel for these respective Defendants and
7

Appellees immediately moved the Court to amend their clients'
Answers, purportedly to correct technical errors, inasmuch as the
Defendants and Appellees had acted pro se throughout these
proceedings. The Defendants' counsel did not disclose the fact
that they intended to forthwith assert the affirmative defense of
statute of limitations [R 47, R 59].

10.

The Plaintiff and Appellant, in his Memoranda in

Opposition to the respective Motions to Amend, expressed his
concern about the ability of the Defendants and Appellees to
assert affirmative defenses at that late date, and therefore also
objected to an amendment of the Defendants' and Appellees' Answers
for that purpose [R 42, R 70].

11.

Nevertheless, the lower court granted the Motions

to Amend of the Defendants [R 84, R 170]. The Defendants then
conveniently claimed, in their Amended Answers and in their
Memoranda in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment, that
all

of the Plaintiff

s claims

were barred, based upon the

affirmative defense of statute of limitations [R 31, R 99].

12.

The lower court then granted the Defendants' and

Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment as to all of the
8

Plaintiff's claims, based solely upon the one-year statute of
limitations corresponding only to the Plaintiff's First Cause of
Action for assault [R 170].

The Court ruled that it was not

possible to contemporaneously assert a cause of action for assault
and a cause of action for negligencef and thus applied the shorter
of the two statutes of limitations in barring completely the
Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims [R 170, R 172].

13.

The Plaintiff and Appellant filed his Notice of

Appeal on May 3f 1995 [R 174].

On or about May 31, 1995, the

Appellee Christensen filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, and
on or about June 7, 1995, the Appellee Apgood filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition, which Motions were denied on or about July
19, 1995.

The case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to

the Utah Court of Appeals on or about June 23, 1995 [R 179].

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENTS

The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judges
William A. Thorne and Tyrone E. Medley presiding, clearly abused
its discretion in granting the Defendants' Motions to Amend their
Answers, and the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. A
party should not be permitted to amend its pleading, in order to
add an affirmative defense which was previously omitted, if the
9

result will be to unfairly disadvantage the nonmoving party.
In addition, the Utah appellate courts have ruled
unequivocally that causes of action for assault and for negligence
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Therefore, the lower
court should not have granted the Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, based solely upon the application of the one-year
statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's assault claim, as a
complete bar to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims for
negligence.
Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact remaining
in this case, to be heard and determined by the trier of fact,
with respect to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's negligence and
equitable estoppel claims. Therefore, this case should be
remanded for such a determination on said genuine issues of
material fact.

ARGUMENTS

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1
MOTIONS TO AMEND THEIR ANSWERS, PURSUANT TO RULE 15,
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In accordance with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given by the Court when
justice so requires. Although the Plaintiff and Appellant does
10

not dispute this general rulef the Plaintiff and Appellant also
refers to Rule 8(c) and Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which pertain to affirmative defenses• The Utah Supreme Court has
held that is affirmative defenses are not plead in a defendant's
answer, they are waived:
Because an affirmative defense raises matters outside the
scope of plaintiff's prima facie case, matters constituting
such defenses must be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a
denial pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule [Rule 8,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]; failure to so plead
constitutes waiver of the defense pursuant to
Rule 12(h) [emphasis added].
Moreover, Utah courts have held that in general, even when a
defendant has been permitted to amend his answer, he is not
entitled to amend in order to cure a defect by adding affirmative
defenses which were not plead in his original answer, and which
were therefore waived. Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.,
299 P.2d 832 (Utah 1956). Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 966 (Utah
1969).
Furthermore, the above rule and case law apply even when pro
se litigants are involved. Defendant Robert Anthony Apgood
asserted, in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendant Apgood*s Motion to File Amended Answer, that "the
prior answer was filed pro se by the defendant individually who is
not knowledgeable with respect to disputes in litigation and
before he had consulted with counsel" [R 61]. Nevertheless, the
11

Utah Supreme Court has held that, in general, "a party who
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge
and practice as any qualified member of the barf" and thus that
party must pay the consequence of his actions. Wurst v.
Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1991),
citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) [the court is
not required to interrupt the course of proceedings to translate
legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt

to

redress

the ongoing consequences of a party's decision to function in a
capacity for which he is not trained].
The Appellees made the decision not to retain counsel, they
voluntarily acted pro se throughout these proceedings, and they
put off hiring legal counsel until a mere three months prior to
the previously scheduled trial before the lower court. The
Appellees must therefore pay the consequences of their decision,
and the Appellant should not have been prejudiced or
inconvenienced by the Appellees' own failure to retain counsel.
It has been held by the Utah Supreme Court that in
considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations
include without limitation whether parties have adequate notice to
meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair
or disadvantage.

advantage

Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d

1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
12

Therefore, to the extent that the Defendants and Appellees sought
to assert any affirmative defenses which were not included in
their original Answers, the Appellant maintains that the Appellees
should not have been given permission by this Court to amend their
Complaints. These amendments clearly placed the Appellant at a
significant disadvantage, and in fact ultimately resulted in a
disposition of the entire case before the trial court.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT AND
FOR NEGLIGENCE WERE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25, and §78-12-29 set forth

respectively the statute of limitations for negligence and for
assault causes of action. Section 78-12-25(3) provides that a
claim for an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law,
namely a claim for negligence, must be made within four years,
whereas Section 78-12-29(4) provides that a claim for assault must
be made within one year.
The Defendants and Appellees, in sole support of their Motion
for Summary Disposition of this appeal before the Utah Supreme
Court [a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B"],
previously made the argument that:
The Appellant missed filing his Verified Complaint
within the statute of limitations period for assault
and battery and could not then attempt to convert an
13

intentional tort into a negligence claim in order
to fall within the four year statute of limitations
period applicable to a negligence cause of action [emphasis
added; see Exhibit "B" at Page 4].
It is important to include the above quotation within the
Appellant's principal Appellate Brief, inasmuch as it serves to
demonstrate and epitomize the line of reasoning of the Defendants
and Appellees, and indeed of the lower court, with respect to the
Plaintiff's and Appellant's two causes of action of assault and
negligence. It is undisputed by and between the parties herein
that the Plaintiff and Appellant, within his Verified Complaint,
set forth two causes of action, the intentional tort of assault,
and the tort of negligence [see Exhibit "A", beginning at Page 3]
Therefore, the Plaintiff and Appellant logically could not have,
and indeed did not need to "convert" his claim of an intentional
tort into one of negligence.
The Defendants and Appellees, as well as the trial court
below, have apparently made the assumption, which is erroneous as
a matter of law, that a cause of action for an intentional tort,
and a cause of action for a tort involving negligence, when
arising from the same conduct, are mutually exclusive.
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court recently held, in Doe v. Doe,
878 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), that:
An individual's acts can simultaneously give rise to a
claim for negligence and a claim for an intentional tort.
14

The two doctrines are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, but rather may overlap and coexist on a
continuum [emphasis added].
In Doe, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and the Utah Court of Appeals, using the above
rationale, held that the trial court improperly granted this
motion on the Plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded the case
for resolution of the fact-sensitive

issue of whether John Doe's

acts constituted negligence.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Strange
v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1979), further clarified this
point by holding:
The line of culpability between that conduct which is
simply negligent and that conduct which is clearly
intentional is a matter of degree. And at some point
along that line, accumulated aggravation of negligence
amounts to willful misconduct. Terms such as willful
negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct
fall on that line of culpability somewhere between
simple negligence and clearly intentional conduct and
involve elements of both. A finding of gross
negligence does not preclude a finding of intent,
and a finding of willful misconduct does not
preclude elements of negligence [emphasis added].
In reference to the above language in the Strange case, the Utah
Court of Appeals in Doe, supra, stated that, "the trial court
appears to have misunderstood this continuum in holding that
defendant's actions could not, as a matter of law, constitute
negligence since they were intentional."

15

Pursuant to the language and reasoning of the Utah courts,
the Appellant Matthew S. Kellogg was entitled to plead both an
intentional and a negligence tortf arising from the Appellees'
conduct. Thus, the Third Judicial District Court erred, as a
matter of law, in assuming that the two causes of action were
mutually exclusive, and summarily applying the shorter of the two
applicable statutes of limitations in precluding the entirety of
the Appellant's claims against the Appellees.
Although the actions

of the Appellees were clearly

intentional, the Appellees may not have intended the actual
injuries which were sustained by the Appellant, and to the extent
that they were sustained by the Appellant. See Matheson v.
Pearson, 618 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) [The Utah Supreme Court reversed
a summary judgment and remanded to the trial court, holding that
the defendant's intentional acts could have constituted reckless
misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff,
and the Court further noted that reckless misconduct is a form of
negligence and is distinguishable from an intentional tort].
Thus, the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims for negligence,
in addition to his claims for an intentional tort, were
appropriate and permitted in this case. The trial court could
have merely dismissed the Appellant's intentional cause of action
of assault and battery on the basis that the limitations period
16

had expired therefor. Howeverf the trial court should have
preserved the Plaintiff's and Appellant's negligence cause of
actionf the limitations period for which had not yet

expired

at

the time the Plaintiff and Appellant filed his Verified Complaint
against the Defendants and Appellees.

III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINING IN
THIS CASE, AND THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PURSUANT TO RULE 56, UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
disposition of a case by way of summary judgment if the following
three elements are established by a moving party:

(1) It must be

shown that no genuine issue of material fact exists; (2) The
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) This
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all
possibilities

reasonable

that the losing party could win, if given a trial.

See Thorn Cook v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Reeves v. Geiqy
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Furthermore, the remedy of summary judgment should be invoked very
reluctantly, inasmuch as it denies the non-winning party the
chance to prove its case to the finder of fact.

"Because a

summary judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their
case to the court, courts are and should be reluctant to invoke

17

this remedy."

Brandt v. Sprinqville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460

(Utah 1960).
It has been held that it only takes one sworn statement to
dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and create
issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v.
Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The Plaintiff and Appellant
submitted a Verified Complaint, setting forth the facts which he
claimed amounted to causes of action for assault and for
negligence against the Defendants and Appellees. The Defendants,
before the lower court, argued that in accordance with the holding
in the case of Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983),
allegations within pleadings are not a sufficient basis for
opposing summary judgments.
However, the obvious exception to this rule is when there is
a verified

pleading, which "can be considered the equivalent of an

affidavit for purpose of defeating a motion for summmary
judgment." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985).
Therefore, there is a sufficiently verified dispute as to the
material facts in this case with respect to the Plaintiff's and
Appellants negligence cause of action, and this would disallow the
granting of a motion for summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty,
Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).
Furthermore, there are genuine issues of material fact
18

remaining with respect to the Appellant's and Plaintiff's claims
of equitable estoppel. There was no evidence permitted, nor
findings made, before the lower court with respect to the
Plaintiff's claims that the Defendants were equitably estopped
from asserting the defense of statute of limitations after failing
to do so for more than two (2) years after they filed their
Answers to the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint.
The Utah Supreme Court, in CECO v. Concrete Specialists,
Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) set forth the elements of
equitable estoppel as follows:
(i) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted;
(ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act or failure to act; and
(iii) injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure
to act [emphasis added].
In the present case, the Defendants made the decision to refrain
from hiring legal counsel to represent them, and the Plaintiff had
absolutely no control over this decision. The Defendants
attempted to defend against the Plaintiff's claims for more than
two (2) years, failing to assert the affirmative defense of
statute of limitations.
The Plaintiff, in reasonable reliance upon this failure to
act, took the appropriate action and proceeded with discovery,
19

accruing attorney fees and costs in this case. The Defendants
should not now be able to amend their Answers, after two years of
failing to do so, merely because they were acting by their own
voluntary election without legal counsel, and in fact should be
equitably estopped from so doing. In any event, the lower court
should have permitted a trier of fact to determine these issues.
It is undisputed that the lower court granted the Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment based upon the application of the
one-year statute of limitations corresponding to the Plaintiff's
and Appellant's cause of action of assault. However, there are
genuine issues of material fact remaining in this case with
respect to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's cause of action for
negligence, the supporting facts for which have been set forth
within the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, and with respect to the
Appellant's claims of equitable estoppel. Therefore, the
Defendants and Appellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, and the granting of their Rule 56 Motions for Summary
Judgment was inappropriate and amounted to a clear abuse of
discretion by the Third Judicial District Court.

CONCLUSION
The Third Judicial District Court clearly abused its
discretion in granting the Appellees' Motions to Amend their
20

Answers, as argued above. Furthermore, the Third Judicial
District Court clearly abused its discretion, as a matter of law,
in granting the Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment,
apparently laboring under the misapprehension and erroneous
assumption that the Appellant's two causes of action were mutually
exclusive. Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact
involved in this case with respect to the Plaintiff's and
Appellant's Cause of Action for Negligence, and with respect to
the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims of equitable estoppel,
which issues should be remanded for such a determination to the
Third Judicial District Court trier of fact.
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Appellant
respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals examine this
case and reverse the lower court's Summary Judgments in favor of
the Defendants and Appellees, and properly remand this case to the
trier of fact.
DATED this //•

day of October, 1995.

W

L

^>RAY tfOLL
A t t o r n e y f o W f c l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t
Ma'Wihew S. K e l l o g g
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on
this

y~

day of October, 1995, to the following:
CARMAN E. KIPP
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Center I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Attorney for Appellee Robert Anthony Apgood
ANDREW M. MORSE
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Attorney for Appellee Stan J. Christensen
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and
ERIC TODD STRAIN,

Civil No.
Judge

Defendants.

Plaintiff for a cause of action against Defendants alleges as
follows:
COUNT I

1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah.

Utah.

&km "A
M.U

3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

4.

On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately

8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without_just cause and with a
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff.

5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the
Plaintiff, Plaintiff's

lips were sutured

and an x-ray taken

discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek.

6.

Defendants' malicious

attack

upon

Plaintiff

caused

Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional
medical damages as will be shown at trial.

7.

In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of
Defendants' malicious conduct.

8.

Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was

knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of
2

Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages
in the amount of $50/000.00.

9.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as
follows:

A.

Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus

any additional amounts that are shown at trial;

B. Judgment in the amount of $50,000.00 in punitive damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E.

Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the

premises•
COUNT II

1.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations

set forth in

paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint.

2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m.,
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah
concerning each party way of playing golf.

3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's lip and a hairline fracture to
his cheek.

4.

As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has

incurred medical bills of $585.92 plus additional expenses as will
be shown at trial.

5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the
amount of $25,000.00.

6.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as
4

follows:

A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in general damages, plus
additional expenses as will be shown at trial;

B.

Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises.

DATED this />

day of

/QA.^

1992.

ZOLL & BRANCH

-^ YY

BlJ RAY' ZOLL U
Attorney /for Plaintiff
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Matthew S. Kellogg, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes

and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter,
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to
those matters, he believes them to be true.

r

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

\ C< day of Apgirl,

1992.
1 ^/> Qs~\

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission E x p i r e s :
*^~-^*~~~-*-^~~^~^'^*^+~«~*+-

»
Jfc-NEALCUNDEMAN
Notary Public
STATE CF UTAH
implalnt

Comm. Exp. June 16,1993
080 W 5300 S #380, SUC» IT 84123

U.O U-h

Residing a t : \[ Q

A

CARMAN E. KIPP, #1829
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, #5352
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801) 521-3773
Attorneys for Appellee Stan J. Christensen

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,
Appellant,

Docket No. 950198

vs.
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD,
Appellees.

Appellee Stan J. Christensen hereby submits the following
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Disposition.

FACTS
1.

On August 5, 1991, a fight occurred between the Appellees

and Appellant at the Glenmoor Golf Course in West Jordan, Utah.
(Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Paragraph 4)
2.

Appellant claims to have suffered injuries as a result of

the fight.

(Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Paragraph 5)

u A <i
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3.

On September 21, 1992, Appellant filed his Verified

Complaint in Third District Court alleging two causes of action,
assault and battery and negligence.
4.

(See Attachment A)

On January 31, 1995, Appellee Christiansen filed his

Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the statute of limitations
for assault and battery had expired prior to the filing of the
Complaint. Appellee Christensen further argued the Appellant could
not conceptually convert the alleged intentional tort to a claim of
negligence

to

avoid

imposition

of

the

assault

statute

of

limitations.
5.

On April 25, 1995, Summary Judgment was entered on behalf

of Appellees dismissing Appellant's Complaint with prejudice and on
the merits.

(See Attachment B)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
trial

court ruled

as a matter of

law that the statute of

limitations as to assault and battery had expired prior to the
filing of the Complaint and there was no negligence cause of
action.

Legal conclusions are afforded no deference.

Walker v.

Briaham City. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993).
In reviewing whether Summary Judgment is appropriate, the
Appellate Court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. K & T, Inc. v. Koroulisr 254 Utah Advance Report 3 (1994).

2

BACKGROUND
In order to demonstrate that the Appellant's grounds for
review are so insubstantial as not to warrant further proceedings
and consideration by this Court, Appellee Christiansen addresses
each issue raised by Appellant in his Docketing Statement.

ARGUMENT
A.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the
Appellees to amend their Answers and plead the
affirmative defense of statute of limitations to the
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
party will be freely given leave to amend his pleading when justice
so requires.
1992.

The Verified Complaint was filed on September 21,

Appellee Christiansen responded pro se.

He was unaware of

his duty to assert an affirmative defense and proceeded with the
litigation.

Once Appellee Christiansen retained counsel, counsel

immediately requested permission from the trial court for leave to
file an Amended Answer.
The trial court is under a directive to freely grant a
requesting party leave to file an amended pleading.

So long as

leave is granted and the affirmative defense is then raised, the
defense is not waived.

Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation

Co. P 664 P. 2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983).

The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the Appellee an opportunity to
amend his Answer because Rule 15 favors a liberal grant of leave to
amend pleadings. If filing an Amended Answer allowed the Appellee
3

to raise an affirmative defense which summarily resolved the case,
equity and justice required the leave to be granted, and trial
court's

entry

of

Summary

Judgment

as

a matter

of

law was

appropriate.

B.

Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the entirety of the Plaintiff's
Complaint?

The Verified Complaint alleged two causes of action:
assault and battery and (2) negligence.

(1)

Appellant argued that he

was negligently hit by the Appellees in this fight.

The trial

court considered the Appellee Christiansen's argument on both
causes of action when it entered judgment in favor of Appellees.
The Appellant missed filing his Verified Complaint within the
statute of limitations period for assault and battery and could not
then attempt to convert an intentional tort into a negligence claim
in order to fall within the four year statute of limitations period
applicable to a negligence cause of action.
The Court considered the Memorandum

filed in support of

Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment in which Appellant confirmed
that the altercation between the parties was anuassault and that he
was intentionally struck.

(See Attachment C)

In Matheson v.

Pearsonr 619 P.2d 321, 322, this Court stated that if an individual
engages in an intentional act but without the requisite intent of
causing harm, the individual is not guilty of an,intentional tort
but of negligence.

Here the Appellant agreed that he was

4

intentionally assaulted. The trial court did not err in dismissing
the negligence cause of action.

C.

Are there genuine issues of material fact remaining in
the case, including but not limited to, equitable issues?

The Appellant has failed to comply with Rule 9(c)(5) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure in that he has not expressed this
issue in the terms and circumstances of the case.

In reading the

issue, Appellee Christensen is unable to adequately respond because
the broad statements are applicable to any case involving the entry
of Summary Judgment.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the grounds for review cited by
Appellant are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings
and consideration by this Court.

Therefore, this Court should

grant Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition and affirm the
Order of the trial court which forms the basis of this Appeal.

ATTACHMENTS
A.

Complaint

B.

Summary Judgment

C.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Apgood's Motion for
Summary Judgment
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DATED this 31st day of May, 1995.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

Carman E. Kipp
Sandra L. Steinvoort
Attorneys for Appellee
Stan J. Christensen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was mailed,
postage prepaid, this 31st day of May, 1995 to the following:
B. Ray Zoll
Zoll & Branch
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah

84123

Andrew M. Morse
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000

^ K d A l ^ . J\f\A^(MYf
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and
ERIC TODD STRAIN,

Civil No.
Judge

Defendants.

Plaintiff for a cause of action against Defendants alleges as
follows:
COUNT I

1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah.

Utah.

3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

4.

On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately

8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without just cause and with a
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff.

5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the
Plaintiff, Plaintiffs

lips were sutured

and an x-ray taken

discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek.

6.

Defendants' malicious

attack upon

Plaintiff

caused

Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional
medical damages as will be shown at trial.

7.

In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of
Defendants' malicious conduct.

8.

Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was

knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of
2

Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages
in the amount of $50,000.00.

9.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as
follows:

A.

Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus

any additional amounts that are £*hown at trial;

B. Judgment in „the amount-of $50,000.00 .in punitive^damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E.

Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the

premises.
COUNT II

1.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint.

2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m.,
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah
concerning each party way of playing golf.

3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's lip and a hairline fracture to
his cheek.

4.

As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has

incurred medical bills of $585.92 plus additional expenses as will
be shown at trial.

5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the
amount of $25,000.00.

6.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as
4

follows:

A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in general damages, plus
additional expenses as will be shown at trial;

B.

Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises.
/?,
fi£

DATED this I y

' "A
day of

\&L
//U.>)

'
, 1992.

B'J RAY' ZOLL (J
A t t o r n e y /for P l a i n t i f f
VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Matthew S. Kellogg, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes

and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter,
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to
those matters, he believes them to be true.

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1992.
;

My Commission E x p i r e s :

Resuming a t : \[ (V

complaint

Comm. Exp. Jur» 18,1993

day of Apsirl,

jVN - V ^ ^ I

JbNEALCUNDEMAN
Notary PubBc
STATE CF UTAH
000 WWOO S #300, SUC» UT 84123

\Q
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ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Apgood
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD,

Case No. 920905255

Defendants.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant Apgood submits this Memorandum supporting his Motion for Summary
Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
This is an assault and battery case, arising from a fight between the plaintiff and the
defendants. Plaintiff pleads two counts: assault and battery, and negligence. The one-year
statute of limitations bars the assault and battery claim; the negligence claim fails because it is
undisputed mat no negligence was involved.

FACTS
1.

This defendants joins in and adopts the Statement of Undisputed Facts contained

in the Memorandum supporting Defendant Christensen's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
1-31-95.
2.

The plaintiff testified: "And the next thing I know, I get grabbed from my left

side, which is where Christensen was, spun around and hit in the side of the face by Apgood
with a right hook and dropped me to my knees." (Plaintiffs deposition p. 18, attached as
Exhibit A).
3.

Plaintiff admitted that the blow struck by Mr. Apgood was not accidental:
Q.

Would you say that Mr. Atwood meant to hit you?

A.

Atwood or Apgood?

Q.

I'm sorry, Apgood?

A.

I believe his name is Apgood. Yeah, I would definitely say he meant to
hit me. As a matter of fact, after he hit me, he was standing over top of
me doing his Hulk Hogan imitation screaming at me like he was King
Kong. I remember looking up and seeing that. (Plaintiffs depo, p. 51,
attached as Exhibit B).

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs assault and battery claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
U.C.A. § 78-12-29 (1953 as amended). This defendant joins in and adopts Defendant
Christensen's Memorandum supporting his Motion for Summary Judgment.

-2-

Plaintiffs negligence claim also fails. He admits that defendant Christensen intended to
strike him. [Statement of Facts, 11 2 & 3]. This testimony refutes his own verified allegation
that "[defendants negligently hit plaintiff . . . ."

(Verified Complaint 1 3, attached as

Exhibit C]. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the one-year assault and battery statute by alleging
negligence fails, because the undisputed facts are that defendants were not negligent.

CONCLUSION
Summary judgment should issue for the reasons stated above.
DATED this

^

day of February, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Andrew M. Morse
Attorneys for Defendant
Robert Anthony Apgood

26\AMMM5607.038\pWg.mem
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1
2
3
4

because I thought he was going to shove me again.
Q

You're showing me your hands up kind of level

with the ground and out in front of you?
A

Right, both of them.

Both of my hands were

5

where his shoulders were so that he didn't swing at me

6

again.

7

He shoves me hard.

8

out like this, about his shoulder-length high, and I

9

believe my hands were on his shoulders like this.

10

He shoves me, and this all happened really fast.
I took a step back.

I put my hands

And the next thing I know, I get grabbed from

11

my left side, which is where Christensen was, spun around

12

and hit in the side of the face by Apgood with a right

13

hook and dropped me to my knees.

14

like this, and I had blood going everywhere.

And I put my hand up

15

Q

You're showing me your hand to your face?

16

A

Right.

17

Q

Your right hand?

18

A

I had blood going all over, and the next thing

19

I know, the people from the golf course are there

20

breaking it up.

21

going to admit this, but he was scared to death.

22

thing he did is run to the cart, which was 10 yards back,

23

and grab a golf club and start swinging a golf club; not

24

at them, from a distance.

25

My friend Darren, he's probably not
First

Yelling, "Come on.w

Because I could tell —

I mean, there's four

MERIT REPORTERS
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1

A

Asks me about what?

2

Q

Your scar.

3

A

No.

4

Q

Would you say that Mr. Atwood meant to hit

6

A

Atwood or Apgood?

7

Q

I'm sorry, Apgood.

8

A

I believe his name is Apgood.

5

9

you?

definitely say he meant to hit me.

Yeah, I would

As a matter of fact,

10

after he hit me, he was standing over top of me doing his

11

Hulk Hogan imitation screaming at me like he was King

12

Kong.

I remember looking up and seeing that.

13

Q

What did he say?

14

A

He was just — he was pumped up, adrenaline.

15

I don't know what he said.

He was pumped up standing

16

over top of me like he just took me out, and he had.

17

Q

But you don't remember what he said?

18

A

I can't remember exactly what he said, no.

19

Q

Do you remember generally what he said, or

20
21

have you told me everything you remember about it?
A

Generally, I believe he was just kind of

22

yelling at me, whatever.

23

exactly.

I do not know what he said

24

Q

Did he threaten to hit you again?

25

A

I don't think he needed to.
MERIT REPORTERS

I wasn't going
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 262-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and
ERIC TODD STRAIN,

Civil No.
Judge

Defendants.

P l a i n t i f f f o r a c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t Defendants a l l e g e s as
follows:
COUNT I

1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah.

Utah.

3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

4.

On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately

8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without just cause and with a
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff.

5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the
Plaintiff, Plaintiff's

lips were sutured

and

an x-ray taken

discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek.

6.

Defendants' malicious

attack

upon

Plaintiff

caused

Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional
medical damages as will be shown at trial.

7. In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff,
Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of
Defendants' malicious conduct.

8.

Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was

knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of
2

Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages
in the amount of $50,000.00.

9.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as
follows:

A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus
any additional amounts that are shown at trial;

B. Judgment in the amount of $50,000.00 in punitive damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E.

Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the

premises.
COUNT II

1.

Plaintiff

incorporates the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint.

2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m.,
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah
concerning each party way of playing golf.

3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's.lip and a hairline fracture to
his cheek.

4.

As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has

incurred medical bills of $585,92 plus additional expenses as will
be shown at trial.

5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the
amount of $25,000.00.

6.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages

as allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff ~prays judgment against Defendants as
4

follows:

A. Judgment in the amount of $585,92 in general damages, plus
additional expenses as will be shown at trial;

B.

Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages;

C.

Costs of Court;

D.

Interest as allowed by law; and

E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises.

DATED this \?

day of

/ft*j*l

1992.

B^RAY' ZOU, (J '
Attorney /for Plaintiff
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
•: SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Matthew S. Kellogg, b e i n g f i r s t duly sworn under oath, deposes

and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter,
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to
those matters, he believes them to be true,

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

6

r
\ (.'• " day of -Apg^l,

ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Apgood
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW S. KELLOGG,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD,

Case No. 920905255
Judge William A. Thome

Defendants.

The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment came on for regularly scheduled hearing
on March 30, 1995. The Court heard argument from all parties. Based upon the Memorandum
filed with the Coun, and die parties' oral argument, and for cause appearing, the Coun grants
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
ORDERS mat the plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.

DATED this,

day of April, 1995.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to form
ZOLL & BRANCH

By.
UB. Ray Zoll
Attorneys for1

KIPP/AJ^D CHRISTIAl<tlp^€.

Carman E.1 Kipp
Attorneys for Defen3a&,
Christensen
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